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Abstract
The processes that led to the default and restructuring of the Argentinean debt
constitute the main focus of the paper. The evolution of the foreign debt in the long run
is examined as well as the macroeconomic performance before and after the crisis. The
restructuring proposal and the relationship between Argentina and the IMF are presented.
The repercussions of Argentina behavior on the international ﬁnancial architecture are
analysed.
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1 Introduction
To us, who have written this work, the study of the Argentinean foreign
debt does not need justiﬁcation. For almost three decades, the foreign
debt was continuously one of the main concerns of economic policy.
On the other hand, both the record amount of the defaulted debt and
the novel characteristics of its restructuring may be suﬃcient reasons to
include an analysis of Argentina in a selection of studies about sovereign
debt. Therefore, the processes that led to the default of the debt and
its subsequent restructuring constitute one of the focuses of this work.
However, the case also presents other singular aspects that call for attention.
Our analysis is also focused on some of them.
References to the country are frequently found in the recent literature. It
is often used as an example of general arguments that take Argentina as a
notable particular case. The rhetoric power of the example precisely comes
from its supposedly well-known characteristics, that sometimes seem to
exempt the quote of solid proofs. Many are second hand references and in
some cases not even that but the mere mentioning of a ‘consensual image’.
This is a motivation to take a close look at what happened in Argentina.
This work is in part guided by the polemic with some of those references
that we consider fallacious. Each reference involves certain facts that
we examine and try to explain. Our criticism also reaches the general
plausibility of the argument that falsely takes the Argentinean case as
an example. We think that the plausibility of an argument is strongly
questioned when the argument is proved false in the case serving as its
notable example.
1.1 Debt intolerance
In the ﬁrst place we consider the reference that takes the Argentinean
experience as an example of debt intolerance. The confrontation with this
approach leads us to the analysis of the long-term evolution of the foreign
debt.
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Some economists include Argentina into the group of countries that carry
the original sin of being serial defaulters and consequently suﬀer from
debt intolerance (Reinhart et al. (2003); and Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004)).
From this perspective, the general explanation of the recent crisis and
default would be found in the combination of two factors. One is the
country’s own debt intolerance, an inherent characteristic attained by
the country along its two centuries of existence. In the short run this
characteristic is as ﬁxed as the country’s ethnic population composition.
The other factor is the government irresponsible behavior, pushing the
foreign debt above the country’s low limit of intolerance. The diagnostic
requires an international ﬁnancial market willing to lend over that limit.
The propensity to do it is considered an intrinsic feature of the ﬁnancial
markets, associated to its procyclical character. In those circumstances, the
high risk premium charged by the market and the propensity to sudden
stops make their contributions to determine a high probability of default.
Argentina’s latest default adds to the series, conﬁrming that the original
sinners sin repeatedly.
Criticizing this vision helps us to set some issues related to the problem of
the Argentinean foreign debt in a long-term perspective. The ﬁrst one is the
irrelevance of the remote past. The insertion of the developing economies
into the present phase of ﬁnancial globalization dates from the beginning of
the seventies, when the international banks plenty of liquidity were anxious
to lend and Latin American countries became the ﬁrst recipients of these
credits. Which could be in this context the relevance of the memories of
the thirties’ international crisis? After forty years of practical inexistence
of an international capital market, the countries’ foreign debts were small
and concentrated in governments and multilateral institutions.
In any case, had the remote past been relevant it would have been
so to improve the risk valuation of Argentina, since in the thirties the
country completely fulﬁlled its ﬁnancial obligations whereas other nine
Latin-American economies fell in default and other four only paid part of
the interests (US Department of Commerce, 1933). Argentina was precisely
the exceptional case among Latin-American debtors; it was the country that
didn’t fall in default in the thirties!
All the Latin-American economies that got indebted with the international
banks in the seventies, including Argentina, fell in default in the
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1981-82 crises (although Colombia restructured its foreign debts without
defaulting).
If the remote past is irrelevant and all the indebted Latin-American
economies fell in default in the early eighties, only the post crises
countries’ trajectories could explain the diﬀerences in risk valuations made
by the international ﬁnancial markets. In fact, coming from a common
experience of crisis and default, the countries’ evolutions have taken
diﬀerent directions. Which are the most important elements diﬀerentiating
the countries in the eyes of the international market: reputation or the
debt-sustainability indicators?
Let us exemplify our view by considering the four biggest Latin-American
debtors that fell in default in the beginning of the eighties: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Mexico. All of them are classiﬁed as serial defaulters in
the ‘debt intolerance’ approach. Among these countries, only Argentina fell
again in default later on. Certainly, Brazil and Mexico did suﬀer from ‘debt
problems’ after the crises of the early eighties (and also Argentina in 1995,
when the country experienced the ‘Tequila eﬀect’ crisis), but they fulﬁll
their external obligations.
The four mentioned Latin-American economies got diﬀerent – and changing
– country risk valuations from the market in the nineties. The countries
followed diﬀerent trade and ﬁnancial integration paths that led to
conﬁgurations with diﬀerent degrees of vulnerability vis-` a-vis the market’s
volatility and contagion that emerged in the nineties. We have argued in
other works that those diﬀerent paths – reﬂected in dissimilar evolutions
of the debt ratios and other indicators of foreign debt sustainability –
are to a great extent associated to the diﬀerent policies followed by
the countries from the second half of the eighties (Frenkel (2003a) and
Frenkel (2003b); Damill et al. (1993)). Certainly, ﬁscal and public debt
policies played a signiﬁcant role, but the exchange rate policy and the
ﬁnancial opening management – intended to facilitate the preservation of
competitive exchange rates – were also singularly relevant.
The extraordinary emphasis that the debt intolerance approach puts on
both the remote past and rigid institutional features takes the focus out of
what could be the most fruitful perspective in an international comparative
analysis of the external debt problem: the diﬀerent policies followed by the
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countries in their processes of ﬁnancial integration into the global system.
The four above-mentioned Latin-American economies well illustrate this
point. They have a common remote past – with the caveat that Argentina
did not fall in default in the thirties –, a similar ﬁrst phase of indebtedness
in the seventies and the default in the beginning of the eighties. Nevertheless
the debt ratios, the foreign debt sustainability indicators and the market’s
risk evaluations showed diﬀerent evolutions in the nineties. The analysis of
the diﬀerences in the recent past is clearly more interesting than the remote
past common features.
In this work, our long-term analysis pays special attention to the economic
policies that framed Argentina’s external debt growth. The conclusion is
that there is no supporting evidence for the ‘debt intolerance approach’. We
show that from the end of the seventies the country has got an intolerable
debt burden. In the origin of the external debt problem there is not a remote
original sin but a more recent original policy mistake – essentially, the
combination of capital account opening, ﬁxed nominal exchange rate and
appreciated real exchange rate. That original policy mistake was repeated
again in the nineties.
1.2 Fiscal proﬂigacy
The second reference we criticize is the one that takes the Argentinean case
as an example of an uncontrolled public spending as the main cause of
crises and defaults. This is probably the most common false image of the
Argentinean case (Mussa (2002)). We have analyzed this issue in previous
works (Damill and Frenkel (2005); and also Damill et al. (2003a)). The
polemic leads us to a detailed examination of the ﬁscal accounts. We show
that the cumulative eﬀects of the interest rates’ rise, pushed by the increase
in the country-risk premium after the Asian and Russian crises, were the
main cause of the public debt dynamics in the last quarter of the nineties.
The interests’ item was the main factor explaining the increase in the
ﬁscal deﬁcit in the 1998-2001 period. The deﬁcit of the pension system
also contributed to that increase. The fall in the public pension system
receipts mainly resulted from the recession and the employment contraction
that started in mid-1998; thus, it was also an indirect eﬀect of the new
ﬁnancial conditions. The ﬁscal deﬁcit increased despite a signiﬁcant rise
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in the primary balance surplus. The climbing trend in the country-risk
premium and the interest rate can be associated with the situation of
the fragile external accounts or, alternatively, with the evolution of public
ﬁnances, or with both, as the investment funds analysts and the risk rating
agencies actually did in their reports. However, even if the uncertainties
regarding public debt sustainability weighted signiﬁcantly in the investors’
assessments, this should not hide the original source of the rise in public
deﬁcits and debt in the late nineties. The main source was not an exogenous
mistaken ﬁscal policy, but the compounded eﬀects of inherent fragility and
contagion.
1.3 The opportunity and costs of the default decision
In this work we also question a reference that identiﬁes the default as
the main responsible factor for the Argentinean deep crisis and its high
social cost. Our analysis shows that the abrupt contraction in the activity
and employment levels came up to a great extent before the default,
while the government submitted the country to big eﬀorts to keep the
debt services on track. The collapse of activity and employment was a
consequence of the generalized run towards external assets and the liquidity
crunch. In the ﬁrst quarter of 2002, the real devaluation added another
contractionary eﬀect. Actually, the default turned out to be one of the
conditions that allowed the recovery that took place soon after. This was
not only due to the positive ﬁscal eﬀect of the payments suspension, but
also a consequence of having freed the economic policy from the need to
continuously issue signals aimed at facilitating the roll over of the debt
obligations. It allowed the implementation of a pragmatic macroeconomic
policy, focused on the stabilization of the exchange market and the quick
recovery of ﬁscal revenues, which became feasible when no further new
private or multilateral external fresh funds were needed. The success of this
policy provided the frame for the recovery. Our conclusion is that when a
country faces a crisis motivated by ﬁrm expectations of default, what is
really costly is the postponement of the default and not the default itself.
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1.4 Argentina, the IMF and the international ﬁnancial architecture
The role played by the Argentinean case in the evolution of the international
ﬁnancial architecture is also a matter of interest. At ﬁrst sight it is striking
that the crisis and the massive default took place in a country that for
a long time was considered an example of the Washington Consensus
success. Almost until the end of the nineties, the IMF and most of the
ﬁnancial market’s analysts considered the experience as one of the successful
cases of macroeconomic policy and structural reforms in the ﬁnancial
globalization context. In the middle of the crisis, the IMF’s commitment to
the convertibility regime – particularly, the rescue package granted to the
country in the end of 2000 and extended in 2001 – generated criticisms and
conﬂicts in the institution. These issues motivated a special investigation
by the Independent Evaluation Oﬃce (which mandate only covered the
convertibility regime period).
The relationship between Argentina and the IMF is also peculiar in the
period following the default and this singularity extends to nowadays. The
debt restructuring took place in the context of a conﬂictive relationship
between the IMF and the country. It was also a period in which the role
played by the IMF in the ﬁnancial international system was changing. The
most unusual feature in this process is that the IMF did not participate
in the design and management of the debt restructuring. Neither did
the organism audit the government’s ﬁnancial projections that justify the
sustainability of the proposal. These circumstances have no precedent in the
international ﬁnancial system that has been developing from the seventies.
The importance of this novelty is highlighted both by the record dimension
of the restructured debt and by the unprecedented haircut, the highest in
the debt restructuring history of the recent globalization period. Is this the
antecedent of a new relationship between the IMF, the emergent-market
countries and the markets?
The mentioned topics are treated below in four chapters. The following one
examines the evolution of Argentinean foreign debt in the long run and the
macroeconomic policies that contribute to explain it. What happened in
the nineties deserves special attention. Then, chapter 3 is dedicated to the
analysis of the macroeconomic performance before and after the recent
crisis. Chapter 4 presents the evolution of the public sector’s ﬁnancial
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obligations after the default and describes the restructuring proposal.
Finally, chapter 5 examines the relationships between Argentina and the
IMF and its repercussions on the international ﬁnancial architecture.
2 Financial Opening and Indebtedness in the Recent Phase of
Financial Globalization
2.1 The Argentinean debt in the long term
Before the recent ﬁnancial globalization process – which initial steps can
be dated in the early seventies – Argentina showed low and stable debt
indicators. The foreign debt, public and private, was mostly owed to
multilateral organizations and governments. It ﬂuctuated in a range of 10%
to 15% of GDP from the beginning of the sixties to the mid seventies, as
it can be seen in graph 1.
As from the mid seventies, the conﬂuence of new international and local
factors gave birth to a new stage markedly diﬀerent from the previous
one. In ﬁrst place, after the oil shock in 1973 the strong expansion of the
euro market opened for the country the easy access to international credit.
Meanwhile, a deep liberalizing ﬁnancial reform was implemented in 1977
and was followed by the progressive dismantling of foreign exchange controls
to capital account private ﬂows in 1978-80. These changes would jointly
operate to completely change the country links with the international
ﬁnancial markets.
As can be seen in the graph 1, the foreign debt/output ratio showed a
rising trend between 1976 and 2000. The ratio measured with the PPP
exchange rate grew approximately 3 percentage points of GDP per year
in this period. The curve is more volatile when the ratio is measured at
current exchange rates, with sharp rises in the beginning and end of the
eighties as well as in 2002, and a strong fall in 1990-93. These jumps are
due to the real exchange rate instability experienced in the period, as can
be seen in graph 2. 1
1 Note that the debt ratio is deﬁned as: (d · P ∗E/y · P), where d is the debt measured in real
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(1) Debt in dollars multiplied by current exchange rate and divided by GDP a current prices 
(2) Debt in dollars multiplied by PPP exchange rate and divided by GDP a current prices 
Note: PPP exchange rate was calculated as the 1935-2003 average real exchange rate, using US and Argentina Consumer 
Price Indexes.  
Source: Authors´ calculations based on Ministry of Economy. 
The total foreign debt/exports ratio, another standard debt indicator shown
in graph 3, complements the mentioned evidence. It rose abruptly since
1977, especially between 1977 and 1982, and never returned to the previous
level. The 1976-2003 average much more than duplicates the level registered
in the period ending in the mid seventies.
dollars, P ∗ is the international price level, E the nominal exchange rate, y the real GDP, and P
the domestic price level. Therefore, this ratio is aﬀected by variations of the real exchange rate
(EP ∗/P). Ceteris paribus, the real depreciation increases the debt ratio and the real appreciation
reduces it.
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Source: Authors´ calculations based on Ministry of Economy 
 
2.2 Three stages
Between the mid seventies and present times, three main stages can be
distinguished in the evolution of the debt.
In the ﬁrst stage, between 1977 and 1982, Argentina went trough a phase
of ﬁnancial opening and accelerated indebtedness that ended up in massive
capital ﬂight, exchange rate crisis, devaluation and default. The second
stage is a long period of international credit rationing, between 1982 – the
Latin American’s debt crisis year – and 1990. The third stage comprises the
1991-2001 period. As the ﬁrst stage, it was also characterized by ﬁnancial
opening and accelerated indebtedness and exhibited again many of its
features. This is the convertibility period, which would also end up in capital
ﬂight, exchange and ﬁnancial crises, devaluation and default.
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In what follows, we present the main stylized facts of the mentioned stages.
A ﬁrst fact that deserves to be highlighted is the role played by the private
sector in the generation of external ﬁnancial obligations. In both stages of
accelerated indebtedness this sector was initially the most dynamic one. As
can be seen in graph 4, the government’s proportion in total obligations
declines between 1978 and 1980. Something similar can be appreciated
in the period starting in 1991, although in this case the process would
be longer. Despite the strong public external debt rise in the nineties,
its participation in total debt declined in more than 20 percentage points
during that period.
The second important fact is that ﬁscal policies have not been the main
factor of the debt growth and the ﬁscal desequilibrium has not been
the main cause of the crises and defaults that followed both phases of
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Source: Authors´ calculations based on Ministry of Economy 
accelerated indebtedness. We will consider this issue in detail below in this
chapter, when we focus the analysis on the nineties’ evolution.
A third fact relevant for the understanding of the indebtness process is that
Argentina entered both phases of accelerated indebtness in the context of
stabilization programs based on the ﬁxation of the nominal exchange rate.
High inﬂation was experienced in the mid seventies and the same happened
in the beginning of the nineties. The opening of the capital account was
in both phases adopted together with the launching of antiinﬂationary
programs (jointly with other liberalizing-reform measures in goods, and
ﬁnancial markets). In both cases, the key instrument of the stabilization
policy was the ﬁxation of the nominal exchange rate instrumented as an
anchor for the stabilization of the prices. 2
2 We are refering to “la tablita” , a program of preﬁxed devaluations implemented from the end
of 1978, and the convertibility regime that established the free convertibility of the peso to the
dollar at a 1 to 1 parity.
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The stabilization programs based on the exchange rate anchoring and
ﬁnancial opening put in motion a cyclical macroeconomic process (Frenkel
(1983); Damill and Frenkel (1987); Taylor (1998); and Frenkel (2003b)).
The exchange rate ﬁxation encourages private capital inﬂows, induced
by the diﬀerence between international and domestic interest rates.
The aggregated demand expands while inﬂation declines, although the
residual inﬂation causes the real exchange rate to appreciate. The current
account worsens as a consequence of increasing net imports caused by
both the exchange rate appreciation and the demand expansion. The
external ﬁnancial needs rise and debt accumulates. This implies that
the vulnerability of the economy to negative external ﬁnancial shocks
progressively increases. The domestic ﬁnancial fragility increases as well.
Exogenous shocks may trigger the reversion of the expansionary trend.
The change in the trend can also be caused endogenously by a domestic
ﬁnancial crisis. This happened, for instance, in Argentina at the beginning
of the eighties. The failed stabilization attempt of the late seventies led to
an internal ﬁnancial crisis that started in early 1980 and developed along
that year. Finally, the program collapsed in early 1981 leaving a heavy
burden of external ﬁnancial obligations.
The mentioned stylized facts help to understand the features of the debt
evolution presented in what follows. Table 1 presents the changes in the
debt/GDP ratio, and the factors explaining them: the changes in the
amount of the debt in dollars and the variations in the real exchange rate
and in the GDP. It can be seen that between 1975 and 1980 the debt ratio
rose by more than 19 points of GDP, measured with the PPP exchange
rate (it passed from 13,2% to 32,4%). The ﬁgures in the same table show
that this result was hidden by the strong exchange rate appreciation, since
the debt ratio calculated with the current exchange rate not only did not
rise but fell in almost 4 points of GDP in that same period.
In 1981, the exchange rate anchor stabilization policy was abandoned,
putting end to the ﬁrst phase of accelerated indebtedness in an appreciated
exchange rate context. A new phase followed, characterized by massive
devaluations of the peso. These devaluations caused the foreign debt ratio
measured in current dollars to reach a peak level close to 60% of GDP in
1982. The ﬁgures in table 1 show that the jump in the debt ratio at current
prices between 1980 and 1982 (more than 44 GDP points) was to a great
extent due to an increase of more than 200% in the real value of the dollar.
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Table 1
Debt ratios variations and its sources
External debt External Real exchange
Period GDP(in PPP) debt/GDP External debt rate Real GDP
(variation in (variation in (variation in %) (variation in %) (variation in %)
in p.p.) in p.p.)
75-80 19.2 −3.8 125.2 −67.8 11.8
80-82 9.9 44.1 37.2 212.8 −8.4
82-90 10.1 −8.3 4.9 −30.8 −2.7
90-01 29.4 2.1 66.6 −33.3 43.0
01-03 2.6 65.0 1.1 118.0 −3.1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Economy.
Nonetheless, the debt in dollars rose 37% between 1980 and 1982. An
important factor behind this increment was the rise in the international
interest rates that resulted from the policy carried on by the Federal Reserve
since 1979.
An important jump in the public sector proportion in the country’s foreign
debt can also be observed in those years (graph 4). In 1981-82 the public
sector ended up absorbing a considerable proportion of the private foreign
debt, with the approval of the international banks. This to a great extent
explains the jump in the participation of the public sector in total debt.
It should also be stressed that no haircut provided relieve to the public
debt in the early eighties default situation (it would only come late and in
homeopathic doses with the Brady agreement in 1992-93).
In the following period of international private credit rationing the debt
measured with the PPP exchange rate kept on increasing, though at a slow
pace. It increased the equivalent of 10 GDP points between 1982 and 1990
(table 1). The external obligations in dollars continued rising despite the
lack of access to the international market (although at a much lower speed
than in previous stages). The stagnant output trend also contributes to
explain the mentioned rise. 3
Later on, in the nineties, the debt’s rate of growth accelerated again,
especially from 1992. The Brady agreement did not provide signiﬁcant
relieve to the debt inherited from the mistaken polices of the late seventies.
The achieved haircut was practically insigniﬁcant. The main favorable
3 Although the access to voluntary international funding was closed, part of the interest ﬂows
accrued in the eighties were accumulated as new debt, i.e., as bank credit involuntary funding,
and would end up being recognized and instrumented in bonds with the Brady agreement.
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impact of the Brady agreement was on the banks’ portfolios, since they
could transform into bonds the defaulted credits, including the past due
interests. 4
During the 1990-2001 period, the foreign debt/GDP ratio, measured with
the PPP exchange rate, rose almost 30 GDP points (table 1). This jump
was completely due to the increase in the debt in dollars, which surpassed
the accumulated GDP growth. However, it can be seen that the debt ratio
measured with the current exchange rate barely rose, as a consequence of
the important real appreciation that took place in the period.
2.3 The public debt in the nineties
We have seen that the total foreign debt, measured with the PPP exchange
rate, increased in almost 30 points of GDP between 1990 and 2001. About
60% of that rise was generated by the private sector. The participation
of the private sector was even more accentuated in the early nineties:
it originated approximately 70% of the increase in the external ﬁnancial
obligations between 1990 and 1995.
The public sector debt issuing was more signiﬁcant in the second half of
the decade, when the international ﬁnancial conditions worsened. Besides,
the placement of public debt in the domestic market started to play a more
signiﬁcant role in those years.
The following graph illustrates the public debt evolution in the period.
The series in the graph and the ﬁgures in tables 2 and 3 allow us to describe
the main stylized facts of the Argentinean public sector indebtedness in the
convertibility decade.
The analysis of the ﬁscal accounts allows us to distinguish three periods in
the nineties. In the ﬁrst period, a sharp adjustment in the public accounts is
4 In 1992, before the agreement, the bonds in circulation were only 17% of total public debt,
whereas in 1993 they had reached almost 65% of it. On the other hand, foreign currency
denominated bonds represented less than 13% of the public debt in 1992, but approximately
57% in 1993.
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(3) Total Public debt as a percentage of GDP calculated using the PPP exchange rate. 


























Consolidated ﬁscal balance (National Administration and Provinces)
(as a percentage of GDP, annual average)
National administration
Primary surplus Total Consolidated
Period without social Primary Interest balance Public sector
security surplus payments balance
(1) (2) (3)
Average 1981-90 nd −4.4 1.9 −6.2 −7.0
Average 1991-94 2.1 1.3 1.2 0.1 −0.6
Average 1995-97 1.7 −0.3 1.7 −2.0 −2.6
Average 1998-01 3.1 0.5 3.1 −2.7 −4.1
Average 1991-01 2.3 0.6 2.0 −1.5 −2.4
(1) Primary balance excluding receipts and expenditures of national security system.
(3) = (2) + Provinces and Buenos Aires City balances.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Economy,
Cetr´ angolo and Jim´ enez (2003) and Gaggero (2003).
observed. The average deﬁcit, which in the eighties was about 7% of GDP,
decreased to less than 1% of GDP in the 1991-94 period. As ﬁgures in table
2 show, this was mainly due to an improvement of 6 points of GDP in the
national public sector balance result, from which 90% is explained by the
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primary balance result.
The year 1994 was a breakpoint in last decade for three main reasons. In
the ﬁrst place, the social security reform that created the Private Pension
Funds was then instrumented. One of the consequences of the reform
was a considerable loss in the contributions to the public subsystem. In
the second place, the expansion initiated in 1990 was then coming to an
end: Argentina would go through the recession associated to the Tequila
eﬀect in 1995. In the third place, the government took several measures
aimed at compensating for some of the negative eﬀects of the combination
of commercial opening and exchange rate appreciation. It did that by
lowering the tax burden on the tradable goods production sectors. All of
the mentioned factors negatively aﬀected the public ﬁnances. Even though,
in spite of these negative eﬀects, between 1995 and 1997 the average ﬁscal
deﬁcit was only 2 points of GDP higher than the early nineties deﬁcit.
This ﬁgure is almost equivalent to the increase in the public social security
subsystem desequilibrium caused by the reform.
However, after 1997 the ﬁscal panorama would change signiﬁcantly. The
impact of the Russian and Brazilian crisis in 1998 resulted in a new jump
in the country-risk premiums, which had already started rising since mid
1997, after the South East Asian crisis. This, on the one hand, negatively
aﬀected the internal demand and triggered a new recession trend. On the
other hand, it increased the ﬁnancial vulnerability of debtors, including
the public sector as well as many private agents that were in a net debtor
position.
Before analyzing this stage in more detail, let us take a look at the
association between the ﬁscal results and the public debt evolution using
the ﬁgures in table 3.
A ﬁrst important observation refers to the discrepancy between the
variation of public sector’s ﬁnancial obligations and the accumulated ﬁscal
deﬁcit, which represents more than 30 billion dollars in the nineties. The
ﬁgures show the main reason of this inconsistency: the veriﬁcation of debts
incurred in previous periods but not registered in the ﬁscal results balance,
especially debt with the public sector purveyors and with the social security
system’s beneﬁciaries (skeletons). There had been erroneous liquidations
and payment delays, mainly during the 1989-90 period, when the economy
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experienced two short hyperinﬂationary episodes.
The documentation of past debts was mostly concentrated in the initial
stage, between 1991 and 1994. Even though, it should be noticed that the
public debt ratio measured as percentage of GDP, was relatively stable up
to 1994, in around 30% in the case of total debt and 25% in the case of
foreign debt (graph 5).
In comparison to the eighties, the 1991-94 phase was in synthesis
characterized by a signiﬁcant improvement in the public accounts and
by the relatively ordered absorption of a considerable volume of debt
mostly generated in previous periods, i.e., by the regularization of liabilities,
many of which were litigious. It is clear from these ﬁgures that the
standard ﬁnancial vulnerability indicators did not show evidence of ﬁscal
sustainability problems towards 1994, when the economy was reached by
the shock resulting from the Mexican crisis contagion.
However, it is undeniable that the high debt burden inherited from the
previous phase – a sort of an original ﬁscal sin of the nineties – is partially
hidden by the real appreciation veil. Graph 5 shows the public debt/GDP
ratio calculated with the PPP exchange rate. As it can be seen, the
curve intersects the 50% line in 1993. The dollarization of the public debt
establishes a direct link between the external fragility and the ﬁscal ﬁnancial
fragility, since taxes are paid in domestic currency. The relevance of this
link is stressed by the exchange rate appreciation.
Between 1995 and 1997 the public debt/GDP ratio increases, in part as a
result of the 1995 recession, and also because of the signiﬁcant ﬁnancial aid
package led by the IMF, amounting approximately 11 billion dollars. This
support enabled the country to quickly recover from the crisis that followed
the Tequila eﬀect. As can be seen in graph 5, in the expansionary phase that
followed the crisis, the debt ratio tended to stabilize again between 35 and
40% of GDP, a relatively low level in comparison to international standards.
Again, in spite of the rise in the current deﬁcit and the desequilibrium in the
social security system, the standard debt indicators did not suggest ﬁscal
sustainability risk towards 1997, before the beginning of the depression.
However, the debt ratio measured with the PPP exchange rate had already
reached 60% of GDP.
EconomiA, Selecta, Bras´ ılia(DF), v.6, n.3, p.29–90, Jan/Jul 2005 46The Argentinean Debt: History, Default and Restructuring
As pointed out above, the Argentina’s macroeconomic panorama would
drastically change soon after, since the August 1998 Russian crisis.
Table 4 helps us to understand some key features of the ﬁscal evolution in
this stage. Public sector’s deﬁcit took a signiﬁcant rising path that would
lead it to reach about 6 points of GDP in 2001, despite the many rounds
of contractive ﬁscal policies instrumented to stop the trend.
In the table 4 we compare the average desequilibrium of the depression
period to the deﬁcit registered in 1994.
In 1998-2001 the average accrued annual deﬁcit (amounting 11.5 billion
dollars) was 7.1 billion dollars higher than the deﬁcit registered in 1994.
Which were the sources of this increase? As it can be seen, it was chieﬂy
due to the rise in the interest payments (+6.8 billions) and, in the second
place, to the ampliﬁcation of the social security system gap (+4.9 billions).
Contrary to the standard interpretation, a relatively minor ﬁgure (+582
millions) is explained by the desequilibrium in the result of the provincial
administrations, though it is true that it was on an increasing path.
The table also suggests that the procyclical ﬁscal policies implemented were
not ineﬀective: they produced a substantial increase in the primary surplus
of more than a 5 billion dollar annual average (without including the public
social security results), though that was not suﬃcient to compensate for the
rises in the interests item and in the social security system desequilibrium.
The explosive trend in the public debt interests account is also observed in
the following table.
The weight of interests on tax resources, which had slightly increased after
1994, takes a fast upward trend after 1996. In 2000, that ratio was nearly
19%, duplicating the ratio registered in the middle of the decade. This was
in part due to the decrease in tax revenues caused by the recession, but it
was fundamentally originated in the rise in the average interest rate paid
by the public debt. The average interest rate of the total public debt went
from 5,8% in 1996 to 9,4% in 2001. Considering that this is an average rate,
it is easy to see that the marginal rate rise was extremely higher.
The rising path of the interest rate is associated with the increasing trend
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in the country-risk premium (the two variables are narrowly correlated in
the 1997-2001 period). These rising trends are the main factors behind both
the consolidate deﬁcit trajectory and the explosive path taken by the public
debt. This is illustrated in graph 5. Between 1997 and 2001, in only four
years, the public debt/GDP ratio increased by more than 20 percentage
points.
3 The Macroeconomic Performance before and after the Default
3.1 The nineties: From euphoria to depression
The basic plot of the macroeconomic story of the late nineties was quite
simple. To start with, the negative ﬁnancial turnaround in the foreign
environment experienced in 1997-1998, after de South East Asian and
Russian crises, found the Argentine economy with a signiﬁcant and growing
current account deﬁcit, a considerably appreciated currency and a visible
lack of policy instruments to deal with this problem, given the rigidities
of the adopted macroeconomic rule. No surprise, in these conditions the
country-risk premium jumped upwards and the access to foreign funds
became more and more problematic. As explained in the previous chapter,
the subsequently increased interest burden had a negative impact on all
borrowers, including the public sector.
Given that the government lacked of other policy instruments, restrictive
ﬁscal policies had to bear with the main burden of the adjustment to
the new situation. The oﬃcial story used to say that ﬁscal discipline
would entail stronger conﬁdence, and consequently the risk premium would
fall bringing interest rates down. Therefore, domestic expenditure would
recover pushing the economic out of the recession. Lower interest rates
and an increased GDP would, in turn, reestablish a balanced budget,
thus closing a virtuous circle. De la Rua’s administration borrowed the
entire argument from Menem’s administration and the IMF gave its seal of
approval. All of them failed.
Hence, the macroeconomic story of the late nineties is about this failure.
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Despite the strong adjustment in the primary result of the public sector
we have already mentioned in the above chapter, the virtuous circle was
never attained. Worse enough, the increases in taxes and the cuts in public
expenditures reinforced the recessionary trend, thus feeding the negative
expectations that prevented the so much expected fall in the country-risk
premium. Fiscal policy alone was impotent to compensate for the strong
macroeconomic unbalances, which laid mainly in the external sector of the
economy. Under this self-destructive ﬁscal policy orientation, the economy
got trapped into a vicious circle for several years, and suﬀered from the
longer recession since the First World War.
3.2 The balance of payments and the public debt under the currency
board
In the following graph we present the results of the principal accounts of
the balance of payment in the nineties. They make possible to complement
our previous discussion by illustrating some important aspects of the
performance of the economy under the currency board regime. 5
Let us start by making a short reference to the early nineties. The
macroeconomic performance of the 1991-95 period clearly ﬁt the stylized
cycle described in the previous chapter. The capital inﬂows-led growth
lasted until 1994. In early 1994 the Federal Reserve started to increase
the discount rates aﬀecting the capital inﬂows negatively and causing the
foreign reserves stop growing, due to the continuously increasing deﬁcit in
the current account.
Then, the contagion of the Mexican crisis of December 1994 triggered a
massive capital outﬂow at the beginning of 1995, with a sharp increase
in interest rates. Foreign reserves fell, as can be seen in Graph 6,
and a contraction ensued. However, the recession of mid nineties was
short-lived. As it was already mentioned, a strong ﬁnancial-support package
structured with the coordination of the IMF helped to change the negative
expectations.
5 A formal model of the dynamics of the Argentine economy under the currency board regime
as well as its econometric estimation can be found in Damill et al. (2002).
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Due to the favorable eﬀects of the external ﬁnancial support, it was possible
to preserve the monetary regime and in late 1995 a new expansion was
already starting. The elements of the cyclical dynamics were once again in
motion. The expansion phase that followed showed the same stylized facts
of the ﬁrst, although this time it was shorter. The country-risk premium
jumped in mid-1997, after the devaluation in Thailand. Then, after the
Russian crisis of 1998, a new contraction started.


















































Table 3. Fiscal deﬁcit and total public debt variation (in millions of dollars)
Consolidated Gros Brady Rescue of
Period Public public debt Discrepancy “Skeletons” Plan’s debt due to Others
deﬁcit variation (3) (4) haircut privatization (7)
(1) (2) (5) (6)
1992-1994 3,247 25,094 21,847 22,859 2,323 7,111 8,422
1995-1997 20,815 22,659 1,844 3,892 0 40 −2,008
1998-2001 45,835 52,817 6,982 5,947 0 0 1,035
Total 69,897 100,570 30,673 32,698 2,323 7,151 7,449
Note: column (2) does not include Central Bank’s debt.
(2) −(1) = (3)
(3) = (4) − (5) − (6) + (7)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Economy,
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Table 4
Comparison between average public deﬁcit of 1998-2001 and 1994
(in millions of dollars)
Consolidated deﬁcit variation 7,112
Social security deﬁcit variation 4,867
National administration’s primary deﬁcit −5,131
variation (excluding social security)
Provincial primary deﬁcit variation 592
Consolidated interest payment variation 6,784
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Economy and
Cetr´ angolo et al. (2000).
Table 5
Total public interest payments, tax collection-GDP ratio and sovereign risk
premium (in percentage)
Tax Average Interest
collection as interest rate payments/ Sovereing
Year percentage on public tax collection risk premium
of GDP debt ratio (annual
(1) (2) (3) average)
1991 18.8 s.d. 5.5 9.6
1992 20.8 6.6 8.3 6.9
1993 21.3 5.0 6.0 4.9
1994 21.1 5.5 6.9 5.9
1995 20.9 6.1 9.2 12.4
1996 19.6 5.8 9.7 6.5
1997 21.0 6.7 10.9 3.3
1998 21.4 7.6 12.2 5.8
1999 21.4 8.3 15.9 7.2
2000 21.9 8.9 18.5 11.5
2001 21.0 9.4 23.4 14.8
2002 19.2 5.2 13.3 -.-
2003 23.1 1.9 9.6 -.-
(1) Includes Security System receipts.
(2) Calculated as a ratio between interest payment in period t and debt at the end
of t − 1.
(3) Tax receipts include those from social security system.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Economy and Gaggero (2003).
EconomiA, Selecta, Bras´ ılia(DF), v.6, n.3, p.29–90, Jan/Jul 2005 52The Argentinean Debt: History, Default and Restructuring
3.3 Foreign debt, public and private
Beyond the mentioned similarities, the second cycle of the nineties diﬀered
from the ﬁrst one in many respects. We want to highlight here one of
them: the dissimilar roles played by the public and private sectors in the
generation of the capital inﬂows that fed the accumulation of reserves (a
crucial variable under the currency board regime).
During the ﬁrst economic expansion, in the early nineties, private inﬂows
were predominant in spite of the fact that the privatization of the most
important state-owned companies took place in that period. Capital inﬂows
to the public sector became signiﬁcant during the recession of 1995, thanks
to the foreign ﬁnancial-support package we have already mentioned. Since
then, capital inﬂows to the public sector were kept at a high level until the
end of the period. Thus, the second expansion in the nineties was bolstered
mainly by capital inﬂows directed to the national government. 6 Meanwhile,
net capital inﬂows directed to the private sector recovered only slowly and,
from mid-1998 on, they stopped ﬂowing in important amounts. Actually,
an abrupt outﬂow started in late 2000.
As Table 6 shows, the increase in the foreign public debt surpassed 35
billion dollars in the period. This amount is quite close to the increase in
the foreign ﬁnancial obligations of the non-ﬁnancial private sector, which
was above 32 billion dollars. If we add the increase in the external liabilities
of the domestic ﬁnancial sector, the amount jumps to more than 44 billion
dollars, but with a signiﬁcant fall in the critical period 2000:4-2001:4.
Thus, the rise in the amount of the public foreign ﬁnancial obligations
(including the Central Bank) explains about 44% of the change in the total
external debt during the period, or about 38% if the year 2001 is excluded
from the calculation. The public sector played, as we have just stated, a
crucial role in the ﬁnancing of the accumulation of foreign reserves in the
nineties. Certainly, the increase in the foreign debt of the private sector
6 Notice that the main channel was not the foreign ﬁnancing of public expenditures, but a
monetary mechanism: the issuing of new foreign debt by the government surpassed its payments
in foreign currency. By selling this surplus to the Central Bank, the Treasury covered the net
foreign currency needs of the private sector and fed the accumulation of reserves, essential for
the expansion of both the money and credit supplies at the domestic level. The mechanism is
discussed in Damill (2000).
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was not less important, but a signiﬁcant part of it had a counterpart in
private outﬂows of funds. In eﬀect, whether the private debt experienced a
considerable increase, also did the external assets of this sector. The Table
6 shows that foreign assets grew more than foreign liabilities in the case
of the non-ﬁnancial private sector. As we have analyzed in other works,
this sector’s net demand of foreign currency was positive in the aggregate
(Damill (2000); and Damill and Frenkel (2005)).
The accumulation of foreign assets by the private sector was small in
1991-94. It rose during the second half of the decade, after the Tequila
shock. As it can be seen in the table, in the expansionary phase extended
from late-1995 to mid-1998, the private debt increased rapidly. It grew
by more than 15 billion dollars (for the non-ﬁnancial sector). But private
foreign assets went up in a roughly similar amount. 7 Furthermore, from
then on the net private foreign debt declined substantially. In the whole
period, it fell by about 19 billion dollars, according to the ﬁgures of the
table. Synthetically, in the late nineties the level of reserves and the internal
liquidity became more and more dependent on the access of the public
sector to foreign funds.8
3.4 The eﬀorts to prevent the default and the end of the currency board
regime
As it usually happens during a crisis, its development involved a
complex succession of events, including many contradictory policy decisions
(especially throughout 2001) and steps back and forward. We will only
mention here some crucial aspects of these processes.
In December 1999 a newly elected government took oﬃce. As we have
7 Capital ﬂights and the dollarization of private portfolios had also been a central feature of
the crisis of the ﬁnancial opening experience of the late seventies. Thus both policy experiments
ended, among other aspects, in a strong de-nationalization of private wealth.
8 Note, in table 6, the important declination of the ﬁnancial sector external assets in the crisis
phase (that adds up more than 10 billion dollars in 2001 only). However, this is basically a
reﬂection of the capital ﬂight of the rest of the private sector. In eﬀect, banks then held the main
part of their reserves (‘liquidity requirements’) in liquid deposits abroad. Facing the withdrawal
of deposits, the banks were forced to use those funds, hence their external assets declined while
the external assets of the rest of the private sector increased.
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already mentioned, the new administration adhered to the belief that
the main cause of the economic depression was not the exchange rate
appreciation and the ﬁnancial vulnerability to external shocks, but the
ﬁscal mismanagement. This vision led the government to adopt a tight
ﬁscal policy as a way to, quite paradoxically, take the economy out of the
recession. We have presented these arguments and the expected results
above. However, the failure of this policy orientation should not hide the
fact that huge eﬀorts were made to balance the public accounts and to
prevent the default of the government’s ﬁnancial obligations.
Indeed, aiming at reestablishing the bridges to the international ﬁnancial
markets, successive packages of tight ﬁscal measures were applied during
2000 and 2001, grounded on the ﬁscalist view of the crisis. We do not
intend to describe them in detail here, but some episodes deserve to be
mentioned as examples of the actions oriented to fulﬁll the commitments
with creditors, both foreign and domestic.
The eﬀorts to prevent the default included, among other measures, a Fiscal
Responsibility Law approved in late 1999 that set a mandatory declining
trend for the public deﬁcit that should bring it to zero in a few years.
Tax increases and expenditure cuts were adopted with that purpose. Later
on, when the credit constraint had become very hard, a “zero deﬁcit”
policy was approved, by mid 2001, determining that the public accounts
had to be immediately balanced (so that total expenditures had to be
adjusted to total cash receipts). The norm intended to guarantee some
basic payments of the state, including interests on the public debt, and
making endogenous the rest of the expenditures subjected to the evolution
of public receipts. The other “protected” items were legally established
transfers of tax receipts to provinces, and wages and pensions amounting
less than 500 pesos per month (or dollars at the ruling parity). The package
included an unprecedented 13% across the board cut in public wages and
pension beneﬁts, which hardly contributed to either the social approval of
the government policy or the social peace. It should be kept in mind that
these measures were taken when the economy was already in the end its
third recession year. These decisions exemplify the huge eﬀorts made to
prevent the default of the public debt.
In any case, the expected “conﬁdence shock” did never materialize. With
the economy suﬀering from a deep recession and caught into a debt trap,
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these rounds of contractionary ﬁscal policies only reinforced the deﬂationary
scenario and the pessimistic expectations, as we have already explained.
During 2000 and 2001 the government attempted to complement the ﬁscal
measures with some initiatives on the ﬁnancial front. It obtained foreign
support and implemented important debt swaps aiming to convince the
public that there was no risk of default. Thus, at the end of 2000 an
important package of local and external support, for about 40 billion
dollars, was announced: (the “blindaje”, ﬁnancial shield). The IMF led
the operation with a 13.7 billion dollar extension of the stand-by credit in
force since March 2000. Local agents (a group of banks and the private
pension funds) also had a signiﬁcant participation. The beneﬁcial eﬀect of
this action was very short lived. Two months after its announcement, and
following the outburst of a new crisis in Turkey, the country-risk premium
started to climb again.
Later on, an important voluntary debt swap (the “megacanje”) was
implemented in mid-2001 to seduce private creditors (local and foreign).
The transaction amounted about 30 billion dollars in public bonds (24%
of the total debt of the National Public Sector at the moment) and had
the IMF’s support. The operation made possible some extension in the
duration, but involved an increase in the nominal debt (of about 2 billion
dollars) as well as a heavy interest burden, because the newly issued bonds
committed dollar interest rates of about 15%. Instead of alleviating the
ﬁnancial constraint, these high interest rates contributed to consolidate the
perception that the debt path had become unsustainable.
Finally, there was another voluntary swap of public debt in November
(although it would be better to call it ‘induced’, semi-voluntary). This was
directed to domestic bondholders (mainly banks and the private pension
funds), who agreed to swap more than 42 billion dollars in public bonds for
the same amount in loans of lower yield but insured by tax revenues. The
operation could not stop, however, the on-going divergent processes.
The withdrawal of bank deposits and the contraction of international
reserves had started in October 2000, with the resignation of Vice-President
Alvarez. In March 2001, after the ephemeral recuperation that followed
the announcement of the ‘blindaje’, this process became more intense and
lasted until mid-June, when the government again issued a new signal
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aiming at changing the expectations: the ‘mega-canje’ (mega swap). As
we have mentioned, the stabilizing eﬀects of this operation were very weak.
In the beginning of July, the deposits withdrawal and the run against the
reserves started again. The intensiﬁcation of these processes could neither
be stopped with the announcement in August of a new extension of 8
billion dollars of the current IMF stand-by credit, nor with the debt swap
in November.
From the beginning of December on the government established hard
restrictions on capital movements and on cash retirements from banks (the
so called ‘corralito’). One of the purposes of the measures was to avoid either
the generalized bankruptcy of the banks or the violation of the currency
board monetary rule. No bank, domestic or foreign owned, complained for
that. But the main objective of the measures was to hold back the demand
for foreign currency, preserve the stock of reserves and avoid the devaluation
(i.e. the formal abandonment of the convertibility regime). It was also the
last drastic move attempting to prevent the default. Yet, the measures
actually did represent the end of the regime.
The December ﬁnancial restrictive measures contributed to deepen the
already strong social and political tensions. After a few days of social
unrest and political commotion the country experienced the resign of the
government followed by a series of ephemeral presidents. One of them
announced to the Congress the decision of defaulting the public debt, and
resigned a few days later. In the ﬁrst days of 2002, with a new president,
the economic policy oﬃcially abandoned the currency board regime and
the one-to-one parity of the peso to the US dollar.
3.5 The macroeconomic performance after devaluation and default
After three years of recession, the economic activity suﬀered from an
additional abrupt fall since mid-2001. The massive ﬂight to external assets
that took place in the second semester precipitated the collapse of the
convertibility regime and ended up in the devaluation of the peso and the
default. Graph 6 shows the strong fall in reserves experienced along that
year that rapidly shrank the liquidity. The payments chain collapsed after
the ‘corralito’ was established. The output and employment followed the
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abrupt contractive trajectory showed by the reserves and liquidity. Social
indicators such us the unemployment rates and the poverty and indigence
indexes, which had considerably worsened along the nineties, suﬀered from
an additional deterioration, adding to the social tensions and the politic
crisis that brought the government of the Alianza to an end (Damill et al.
(2003b)).
3.5.1 The economic recovery
The abyssal fall in output and employment continued after the end of the
convertibility regime, but for a very short period. Certainly, in opposition
to most of opinions and beliefs – including those of the IMF’s oﬃcials
– the traumatic episodes that brought the convertibility regime to an end
were not followed by a deeper depression. Moreover, an extraordinary quick
recovery started only one quarter after the devaluation and default, as can
be seen in graph 7.
In the graph, the ‘V-shaped’ trajectory can be seen, consisting of the
economic collapse phase of the last quarters of the convertibility regime
and the following quick recovery. As we have just indicated, the GDP
recovery started soon after the exchange rate depreciation (around three
months later, as can be seen in the available monthly activity indicators.
The recovery was precisely triggered by the sudden change in the relative
prices in favor of the tradable goods sectors. In the beginning of this phase
the recovery was led by the local production of previously imported goods.
It is remarkable that the beginning of the new phase started to be
perceptible while the country was still immersed in a context of accentuated
economic instability and political uncertainty, and when the services
payments of part of the public debt were interrupted. 9 In other terms,
the ‘rebound’ took place in spite of this extremely complicated setting and
also despite the short-term recessionary eﬀects of the depreciation.
9 When the ﬂoating regime was adopted, soon after the initial devaluation that had taken the
parity to 1.40 pesos per dollar, the exchange rate was weakening; the depreciations pushed up
the nominal prices, the ﬁnancial system was going through a deep crisis, etc.
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3.5.2 Despite the IMF
Apart from the shift in the relative prices, the quick economic recovery
that followed the crisis is also a consequence of a set of policies that, still
with ﬂaws and ambiguities, aimed at recovering the basic macroeconomic
equilibria.
We discuss the Argentinean relations with the IMF in greater detail below
in chapter 5. However, for the purpose of this section it should be stressed
that many of the policies that played important roles in this stage had
to face the IMF’s opposition. Firstly, the imposition of exchange controls.
This measure compelled the exporters to liquidate in the local market a
considerable part of the international currency generated by the exports
and also restricted the capital outﬂows. Secondly, the establishment of
taxes on exports (retentions), which absorbed part of the devaluation’s
favorable eﬀect on the exporters’ incomes (thus signiﬁcantly contributing
to the recovery of the ﬁscal equilibrium), and attenuated the impact of the
devaluation on domestic prices and, consequently, on real wages. Thirdly,
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a ﬂexible monetary policy that initially enabled the assistance to banks
in the crisis phase and afterwards contributed to the recovery of the
money demand, thus helping the recovery. Fourthly, when the exchange
market started to show an excess supply of international currency, an
exchange rate policy attempted to avoid the peso appreciation throughout
the interventions of the Central Bank (and of the Treasure later on).
The IMF put particular insistence in the free ﬂotation of the peso. For a
short period the government adopted this regime. Once the exchange rate
was free to ﬂoat the parity rose abruptly, reaching levels close to 4 pesos
per dollar. The following reintroduction of exchange controls was crucial
to contain the exchange rate bubble. The government managed to stabilize
the nominal exchange rate by mid-2002 by compelling the exporters to
liquidate the international currency in the local exchange market and by
limiting the currency outﬂows.
Soon after, when the exchange rate was stabilized the demand for pesos
started to recover and the exchange market begun to show an excess
of supply of dollars. The stop of the exchange rate bubble decisively
contributed to stop the rise in the domestic prices. The freezing of the
public utilities rates 10 as well as the high unemployment rates – that kept
constant the nominal wages – also contributed to stop the rise in prices.
The quick decline of inﬂation in the second half of 2002 can be seen in the
graph 8.
Another important point involving the tense relations of the country with
the IMF refers to the net ﬂows of funds between Argentina and the
multilateral organizations. In this regard, a substantial change can be seen
after the end of the convertibility regime. Actually, in the post default
phase the net funding of the IMF and the multilateral organizations became
negative. According to the Argentinean Minister of the Economy the IMF
passed from playing the role of ‘last-resort lender’ to play the role of
‘privileged debt payments collector’. This point is illustrated in graph 9.
Whereas in the 1994-2001 period Argentina received from the multilateral
organizations a net funding of more than 23 billion dollars (40% of which
10 Many of which were dollarized and subject to automatic adjustment with the US rate of
inﬂation, as established in the privatizations’ contracts.


























Source: Authors´ calculations based on Ministry of Economy 
were concentrated in 2001), in the 2002-2004 phase the country made net
payments amounting more than 4,6 billions dollars.
3.5.3 The main characteristics of the recovery phase
The GDP recovery that started in the ﬁrst half of 2002 had a short ﬁrst
phase in which the aggregate demand barely rose and in which every
internal component of domestic expenditure (private consumption, public
consumption, investment) kept on shrinking, as it happened, though at a
low pace, along the previous depression. Therefore, it was not the aggregate
demand what stopped the declination in the activity level. The expansive
factors were mainly the international trade variables, exports and imports,
and especially the latter. The local production started to provide an
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increasing proportion of the aggregate demand. This imports substitution
particularly favored the manufacturing sector. After that short initial stage,
the activity level recovery was led by the increase in the domestic demand
components, especially by the investment – that grew at an annualized rate
close to 40% between 2002 and 2004 – and by the private consumption.
It is frequently mentioned that the favorable external context is an
important element behind the economic recovery. In some analyses the main
part of the rebound is usually attributed to a set of positive ‘exogenous’
factors. In those interpretations, this recovery would be taking place in
spite of what is interpreted from this perspective as an economic policy full
of mistakes and omissions. Although the contribution of external facts to
recovery has been undeniable (in particular some commodities’ high prices)
the fact that the substantial part of the expansion’s dynamism derives from
internal demand sources weakens that interpretation.
It should also be stressed that the consumption and investment recovery
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took place in a context of accentuated credit rationing, both external and
internal. The investment was apparently ﬁnanced by higher proﬁts retained
by ﬁrms, although the ‘wealth eﬀect’ resulting from the signiﬁcant external
assets holdings of the private resident sector, surely contributed as well.
These assets – that nowadays largely surpass 100 billion dollars – increased
their value in pesos with the exchange depreciation, and also rose in relation
to the prices of domestic assets such as real estate and land. This was also
a factor that fed the recovery of the private consumption expenditure.
3.5.4 Fiscal and external adjustment
The adjustment experienced by the Argentinean external sector in recent
years took place to a great extent before the devaluation, as it can be seen
in graph 6 where the improvement in the current account since 1998 can
be seen.
Actually, the abrupt contraction that characterized the end of the
convertibility generated an important trade surplus. The trade balance
exhibited a deﬁcit higher than 3 billion dollars in 1998. It rapidly decreased
from then on and turned into surplus, due to the reduction in the volume
of imports. In 2002 the balance was higher than 17 billion dollars, and
remained over 16 billion in 2003 (and over 12 billion in 2004). The trade
surplus caused the change of sign in the current account balance. In recent
years it has shown positive results even taking into account the interests
accrued by the debt in default (as it is shown in the ﬁgures in graph 6).
In fact, the macroeconomic policy has recently been facing the problem
of sustaining the real exchange parity in order to preserve the incentives
to investment in the tradable goods sector in a context of international
currency excess supply.
As can be seen in table 7, a strong adjustment in the public accounts has
been also taking place together with the external adjustment process we
have just mentioned.
The improvement in the Consolidated Public Sector global result that took
place between 2001 and 2004 was equivalent to 9.2 points of GDP. This
result passed from a global deﬁcit of 5.6% of GDP in 2001 to a 3.5% surplus
in 2004.
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Which are the factors explaining the adjustment in the ﬁscal cash ﬂow
results? More than a third of it derives from an improvement in the
provinces’ balances. This improvement comes from the increase in tax
collection facilitated by the recovery and the rise in nominal prices, together
with the restraint in expenditure. Meanwhile, around 60% of the almost
six-points-adjustment in the national public sector’s budget is explained by
the improvement in the primary result (+3.3% of GDP). The contraction
of interest payments, basically resulting from the default of the sovereign
debt, accounts for the rest (−2.5% of GDP).
The rise in the national primary surplus is mainly explained by an
improvement in tax revenues (+4.9% of GDP). It is interesting to observe
that although the receipts from traditional taxes such as the VAT and the
Incomes tax rose signiﬁcantly, they did not increase substantially when
measured as a proportion of GDP. Between 2001 and 2004 they increased
in 1.3% of GDP as a whole. The tax on exports is the item that mostly
explains the rise in tax revenues (+2.3% of GDP). The soy and derivatives
industry generated almost one half of the taxes on exports.
Hence, the public sector absorbed part of the eﬀect of the devaluation on
the proﬁtability of the tradable goods sector, and was also beneﬁted by the
high prices reached by some of the exportable goods, such as soy and oil.
The tax on ﬁnancial operations established in 2001 also contributed to the
increase of tax collection (+0.4% of GDP).
The interest payments on the public debt deserve a separate paragraph.
As it can be seen in table 7, this ﬂow passed from representing almost 4%
of GDP in 2001 to only 1.3% in 2004 (without taking into account the
accrued interests on the debt in default. Table 7 shows cash ﬂows ﬁgures,
not accrued ﬂows).
However, the ﬁscal eﬀects of the suspension of part of the debt services
payments are signiﬁcantly higher than what is shown in the mentioned
account. It cannot be calculated with precision because a signiﬁcant amount
of new debt was issued after the suspension of debt payments, as it is
described in the following chapter. However it can be estimated that the
amount of interests on the public debt – valued at the 2004 exchange rate
– would have represented in that year between 9 and 11 points of GDP.
This is approximately equivalent to one half of the total tax collection of
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the year. These payments would have been certainly incompatible with the
economic recovery. As it was pointed out above, a crucial aspect of the ﬁscal
ﬁnancial vulnerability derived from the extremely high proportion of debt
in foreign currency, with the consequent exposure to the impacts of the
exchange rate variations. The 2002 substantial exchange rate depreciation
would have had a harsh impact on the public sector’s ﬁnancial equilibrium.
Taking this aspect into account, it can be said that the payments suspension
and the following debt restructuring enabled a considerable amount of ﬁscal
savings – either measured in domestic currency or as a proportion of GDP.
However, the most important eﬀect of the default and the end of
the convertibility regime was the recuperation of the instruments of
macroeconomic policy which had crucial importance to take the economy
out of the abyssal situation generated by the agony and the ﬁnal collapse
of the convertibility regime.
4 The Evolution of the Debt After the Default and the
Restructuring Proposals
The suspension of the services payments of a part of the public debt was
declared on December 24th of 2001 (by then the debt reached 144.5 billion
dollars). The measure initially aﬀected 61.8 billion dollars in public bonds
and other 8 billion dollars in diverse liabilities. The rest – mainly debt
with multilateral organizations (32.4 billion dollars) and the recently issued
guaranteed loans (42.3 billion dollars) – remained as performing debt. 11
The devaluation of the peso that followed had a strong impact on the
economy’s contractual structure, given the important dollarization of
contracts inherited from the convertibility period. A few days after the
devaluation, in order to attenuate some of the consequences of the shock,
the authorities resorted to the issuing of new debt. In this chapter we
examine both the generation of these new liabilities (‘non voluntary’ and
‘inertial’, as called in the oﬃcial documents) and the restructuring process
of the defaulted liabilities.
11 Let us remember that the November 2001 public debt swap mentioned in the previous chapter
involved the swap of local agents’ bond holdings for guaranteed loans to the government.
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4.1 The evolution of public debt after the default
As it was pointed out above, there were government interventions aimed
both at reducing the wealth transfer from debtors to creditors and at
avoiding the collapse that would have resulted from the fulﬁlling of
contracts set in foreign currency. The oﬃcial intervention was intended at
managing the ‘distribution of losses’. In many cases the intervention meant
that part of the losses were absorbed by the State via new debt issuing. The
evolution of public debt in the period following the default is summarized
in table 8 presented in the appendix.
The main source of the new indebtness came from the intervention in
the ﬁnancial system, which involved a 14.4 billion dollar public debt rise.
In February 2002 the government decided to compulsively convert the
foreign-currency bank deposits into pesos at a rate of 1.4 pesos per dollar. 12
The withdrawal of the demand and saving deposits was restrained to 1,500
pesos per week. The rest of the deposits constituted until the end of
2001 was transformed in longer term deposits. This measure included both
the deposits recently converted from dollars to pesos and the originally
denominated in pesos.
Bank credits in foreign currency were converted into pesos at a rate of
one peso per dollar. This measure was aimed at avoiding generalized
bankruptcies in the private sector. The ‘asymmetric pesoiﬁcation’ of credits
and deposits caused a signiﬁcant loss in banks’ net worth that was
compensated by the government. The issuing of new debt with this purpose
amounted 5.9 billion dollars. 13
12 When the measure was sanctioned, the dollar was ﬂoating around 2.15 pesos. Four months
later, the dollar exchange rate almost reached 4 pesos, and from then on it followed a smooth
descendant path. From March 2003 on, the parity tended to stabilize between 2.8 and 3 pesos
per dollar.
13 Another measure with ‘asymmetric’ eﬀects also aﬀected the banks’ net worth. The government
established diﬀerent inﬂation adjusting mechanisms of deposits and pesoiﬁed credits. It was
resolved that the deposits would be indexed with an index that follows the consumer prices’
evolution (CER) and that the loans would do so with another index reﬂecting the evolution of
the average wages (CVS). Since the consumer prices inﬂation was higher than the nominal rise
in wages, the value of the banks’ pesoiﬁed liabilities grew at a higher rate than the value of
the assets. In October 2003 the Congress sanctioned a law that empowered the government to
compensate the banks for the ’asymmetric indexation’ by issuing new bonds (BODEN 2013) for
up to 2.8 billion pesos. Up to now, the government has not issued those bonds.
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Many banks’ ﬁnancial positions in domestic and international currency
were not hedged at the time of the devaluation. Therefore, the peso
devaluation caused an additional loss in the banks’ net worth. The
government compensated this eﬀect by issuing 2.4 billion dollar bonds
(‘bonos cobertura’) denominated in foreign currency in exchange for banks’
liabilities with the State. 14
The pesoiﬁcation of the private deposits at 1.4 pesos per dollar and the
forced reprogramming of their maturities triggered strong claims. The
savers claimed for the value of their deposits in their original currency
denomination and for their free availability. In many cases there were
judicial decisions favorable to these claims causing a considerable ‘ﬁltration’
of funds out of the banks. To face this situation, the government of
President Duhalde launched three diﬀerent oﬀers for the voluntary swap
of reprogrammed deposits for new public bonds. 15 The ﬁrst two oﬀers
involved the swapping of the banks’ debts with the savers for public debt.
The third one was intended to free all the reprogrammed funds. In this case
the government issued debt papers for the diﬀerence between the deposits’
value in its original currency (dollar) and the amount eﬀectively disbursed
by the bank (1.4 pesos per dollar plus the inﬂation adjustment, following
the CER index). 16 The three oﬀers as a whole reached a broad acceptation
from the savers. This helped to alleviate the ﬁnancial system’s liquidity
problem, though at the expense of augmenting the public debt in 6.1 billion
dollars in exchange for banks debt with the State. 17
Another source of the public debt increase came from the transfer of
liabilities from the provincial governments to the central government. The
latter absorbed 9.7 billion dollars of the provincial governments’ debts with
the banks. It also undertook the loss derived from the rescue of provincial
governments’ bonds that had performed as currency (’cuasi monedas’)
between 2001 and 2003. 18 In this case, the national government assumed
14 The banks were allowed to cover those obligations by depositing funds in the Central Bank
or canceling debt that the State previously held with them.
15 The ﬁrst oﬀer was launched when the Minister Lavagna assumed in June 2002, the second one
in September of the same year and the last one in March 2003, two months before the provisional
mandate of President Duhalde expired.
16 The frozen demand deposits (‘corralito’) had already been freed in December 2002.
17 The covering mechanism was the same as the one established for the ‘bonos cobertura’.
18 Since the second half of 2001 some of the provincial governments issued bonds that performed
as money. When the rescue process started in May 2003, the total stock of ‘cuasi-monedas’ had
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a liability of 2.4 billion dollars with the Central Bank, the institution that
was in charge of the rescue of the provincial governments’ bonds by issuing
notes in exchange for the provincial bonds. Both transactions were granted
by a proportion of the future ﬂow of national tax resources distributed
among the provincial governments.
During 2002 and 2003 the public debt also rose due to the accounting of
obligations with employees, pensioners and purveyors for 2 billion dollars.
A ruling of the Supreme Court – stating that the 13% cut applied on
public wages and pensions since July 2001 was unconstitutional – forced the
government to issue debt papers for 873 million dollars. On the other hand,
the liabilities with purveyors and other debts committed before the default
amounted 1.2 billion dollars. All together, the measures aimed at managing
directly or indirectly some of the consequences of the convertibility collapse
entailed a gross debt emission of 28.5 billion dollars.
In February 2002 the government determined the conversion into pesos of
all the debt issued in foreign currency under the Argentinean legislation.
The measure would aﬀect 57.5 billion dollar debt, most of it constituted by
‘guaranteed loans’ issued after the November 2001 debt swap. 19 It was also
decided to apply ﬁxed interest rates to the ‘new’ pesoiﬁed debt that varied
from 2% to 5.5%. The ‘guaranteed loans’ had been issued with a clause
that allowed the holder to turn the asset into the original bond in case
the original emission conditions were changed. In 2003 most of the private
pension funds (AFJP) and the local insurance ﬁrms decided to re-convert
their holdings of 17.8 billion dollars of ‘guaranteed loans’ into the original
foreign-currency – denominated bonds. In spite of that, the pesoiﬁcation of
the ‘guaranteed loans’ reduced the value in dollars of the debt issued under
local legislation in about 22.1 billion dollars.
However, the pesoiﬁed debt indexed with the CER experienced a rise due
to the inﬂation. The same happened with the new bonds in pesos issued to
manage the losses caused by the exit from the convertibility regime. Until
the end of 2003 the value of all these obligations rose due to the indexation
eﬀects in about 7.3 billion dollars. In a similar way, capitalized past due
reached 7.5 billion pesos (2% of GDP).
19 The measure also aﬀected public bonds (Bontes, Bocones, Bonos-Pagar´ e and Letes), bilateral
loans, debt with commercial banks and other obligations that added up to about 15 billion dollars
in that moment.
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interests of the defaulted debt accumulated 13.9 billion dollars.
In summary, considering the diﬀerent measures and eﬀects derived from the
management of the convertibility collapse and the declaration of default,
between December 2001 and December 2003 the gross public debt stock
increased in about 28.2 billion dollars. 20
4.2 The proposals for the public debt swap
In the second half of 2003 the ﬁrst oﬃcial steps for the restructuring of the
defaulted debt were taken. In September, after reaching an agreement with
the IMF, the government took advantage of the annual meeting of the IMF
and the World Bank in Dubai to make public the main guidelines and the
agenda of a restructuring proposal.
The ‘Dubai proposal’ established that the oﬀer would be directed to every
bondholder of bonds issued until December 2001 with a uniform treatment,
while keeping performing the rest of the debt. 21 , 22
The government recognized a defaulted debt stock of about 87 billion
dollars. This amount left aside an important volume of past due interests. A
75% haircut was imposed to this amount. According to those guidelines the
issuing of new bonds would reach a maximum amount of about 21.8 billion
dollars. The issuing of three bonds called Par, cuasi-Par and Discount was
announced. Although the speciﬁc characteristics of the instruments were
not divulged, it was mentioned that the Par would preserve the nominal
20 This calculation also includes the eﬀect of the conversion into dollars of the 2008 bond in pesos,
issued in June 2001 with the ‘megacanje’ (477 million dollars). It should also be mentioned that
the ﬁnancial assets of the national government (assets against the ﬁnancial system and provincial
governments) increased in about 11.1 billion dollars between 2001 and 2003, mainly due to the
reasons mentioned above.
21 This set of obligations was denominated the ‘eligible debt’. It consisted of 158 instruments,
issued in 7 diﬀerent currencies (Argentinean peso, inﬂation-adjusted Argentinean peso, US dollar,
euro, yen, sterling pound and Swiss franc) and 8 jurisdictions (Argentina, United States, Great
Britain, Japan, Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland).
22 Rigorously, a set of defaulted obligations (bilateral debt, debt with commercial banks and
other creditors) remained without deﬁnitions regarding its restructuring. This set amounted
about 7.5 billion dollars in December 2003 (including capital and past due interests). By the
time this work is written, the situation of this debt was still unknown.
EconomiA, Selecta, Bras´ ılia(DF), v.6, n.3, p.29–90, Jan/Jul 2005 69Mario Damill, Roberto Frenkel and Mart´ ın Rapetti
value of the original debt but would have longer maturity and lower interest
rate than the other two. The other two bonds would imply nominal haircuts.
The haircut corresponding to the Discount bond would be higher than the
haircut of the cuasi-Par. The new bonds would also incorporate mechanisms
– which would be speciﬁed later on – to reward the bondholders with
a coupon tied to the economy rate of growth. The sustainability of the
proposal was consistent with the primary surplus that had been recently
agreed with the IMF (2.4% of GDP for the central government and 3% for
the consolidated public sector). The government announced that it expected
to maintain that target in the long run.
The voices of the ﬁnancial market expressed strong disapproval. It was
aﬃrmed that Argentina was in a position to make a much better oﬀer
by compromising a higher ﬁscal eﬀort. The IMF exerted pressures on the
government in many ways and repeatedly claimed for signs of ‘good-faith’.
In June 2004, a few months after the G-7 ﬁnance ministers manifested that
Argentina should accelerate the restructuring process and issue ‘good faith’
signals, the government made public a new proposal in Buenos Aires.
Although eﬀorts were made to present it as a reﬁned version of the Dubai
proposal, the ‘Buenos Aires proposal’ was certainly a second oﬀer that
aimed to get closer to the creditors’ positions. The eligible debt was the
same than the one deﬁned in Dubai. The debt to be restructured amounted
81.8 billion dollars. 23 In exchange for that defaulted debt stock new bonds
would be issued for a total of 38.5 billion dollars, in case the level of
acceptance of the swap was lower than 70%, and for 41.8 billion dollars
in case the level of acceptance was higher than the 70% benchmark.
This oﬀer involved a substantial improvement if compared to the 21.8
billion dollars to be issued according to the Dubai proposal. In spite of
it, the government manifested that the 75% haircut on the debt’s nominal
value presented in Dubai would be maintained, although the past due
interests would now be recognized. 24 The announcement created confusion,
23 In the Buenos Aires oﬀer were speciﬁed some details omitted in the Dubai proposal. It was
clariﬁed that the ‘eligible amount’ was comprised by the value of the stock of bonds current at
December 31, 2001 plus accrued interests up to that date. The diﬀerence between the resulting
amount and the 87 billion dollar debt announced in Dubai was mainly due to diﬀerent exchange
rates used to convert into dollars the debt in other currencies.
24 In the lowest acceptation scenario, the recognition of past due interests would include the
period until December 31, 2003 for about 18.1 billion dollars, whether in the highest acceptation
case, it would include the past due interests June 30, 2004, for 21.4 billion dollars.
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since it was interpreted that the swap would consist in a new issuing
(of 38.5 or 42.3 billion dollars, according to the degree of acceptance) in
exchange for an eligible debt that in the Buenos Aires proposal included the
accrued interests, amounting to 99.9 billion dollars (or 103.2 billion dollars,
according to the degree of acceptance). As time passed, it was made clear
that the swap would comprise only the capital of the defaulted bonds while
the past due interests would not be recognized; i.e., liabilities amounting
81.8 billion dollars would be exchanged for new bonds amounting 38.5 or
41.8 billion dollars, depending on the level of acceptance.
The three instruments announced in Dubai were maintained in the
Buenos Aires proposal: the Par, the cuasi-Par and the Discount. 25 It was
established that the issuing date would be December 31, 2003 and that the
bonds would accrue interests since then. 26 The oﬀer to include a coupon
tied to the GDP growth was also maintained. It was announced that the
Par and Discount bonds could be issued in CER-adjusted pesos, US dollars,
euros and yens. The cuasi-Par bond was exclusively issued in CER-adjusted
pesos.
The oﬀer speciﬁed a Par bond issuing of 10 billion dollars in case the
acceptance was not higher then 70% and of 15 billion dollars in the opposite
case. This instrument would recognize the original nominal value of the
defaulted bond, would have a 35-year maturity and would have ﬁxed rates
(in dollars) rising from 1,33% during the ﬁrst 5 years to 5,25% in the last
10 years.
For the Discount bond, it was announced an issuing of approximately
20.17 billion dollars in the lowest acceptance scenario and of about 19.87
billion dollars in the most optimistic one. The new bond would imply a
66.3% haircut on the original nominal debt value, would have a 30-year
maturity and would yield an increasing ﬁxed interest, part of which would
be capitalized throughout the ﬁrst 10 years.
The cuasi-Par bond was designed taking into account the local institutional
holders’ needs – mainly the private pension funds – and involved a 30.1%
haircut. The announced issuing amount was about 24.3 billion pesos (about
25 A detailed description of the bonds is presented in table 9, in the appendix.
26 This issuing date enabled interest payments immediately after the closing of the swap. This
plan aimed at including a sweetener in the proposal to incentive the bondholders’ participation.
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8.33 billion dollars) independently of the degree acceptance. The instrument
would have a 42-year maturity, yielding a ﬁxed 3.31% interest rate in pesos,
with capitalization of interests during the ﬁrst 15 years.
The announcement made in June also speciﬁed the characteristics of the
coupons tied to the GDP growth. 27 There would be issued a quantity of
unities equal to the amount of the capital eﬀectively swapped. These unities
could be separated from the bond and quoted independently since 6 months
after the swap. The possession of each unity would entitle the collection of
the correspondent proportion of 5% of the observed GDP surplus over the
‘base GDP’, provided that the former had grown more than 3% in the
previous year. The ’base GDP’ was deﬁned as a GDP trajectory with a 3%
average annual growth rate, using the GDP of 2004 as a starting point. 28
In comparison to the Dubai proposal, the improvement involved a future
higher ﬁscal eﬀort. The government announced that in order to guarantee
the oﬀer’s ﬁnancial consistency it would commit to maintain a 2.7 points of
GDP primary surplus target during the ﬁrst 5 years – when the service of
the post default issued debt is concentrated – and stabilize the primary
surplus around 2.3% of GDP from 2014 on. With this program and a
3.3% annual average growth assumption, the projections indicated that
the ﬁscal eﬀort would ﬁnance the interest payments, though it left aside a
relevant proportion of the capital maturities, for which funding sources had
to be obtained. Even if the multilateral organizations agreed the reﬁnancing
of their debt amortizations, the government would have to obtain annual
funding for about 2% of GDP, to face capital payments maturing along the
ﬁrst 10 years after the swap. 29
The evidence that Argentina would keep on supporting a heavy debt burden
after the swap did not ease the creditors’ demands. Immediately after
the announcement in June, the bondholder’s organizations rejected the
proposal, claiming that the country should pay more than what was oﬀered.
The ﬁnancial analyses showed that the new oﬀered debt value, including the
27 Table 10 shows a detailed description of its characteristics.
28 Speciﬁcally, the planned base GDP’ trajectory establishes an initial 4.3% growth rate in 2005,
decreases to 3% in 2015 and remains with this pace until 2034.
29 The ﬁnancial program would be even more demanding if the debt service to the multilateral
institutions was included. In that case the government should get an average funding of 4 points
of GDP per year along the same period.
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coupons tied to the GDP-growth, was between 20 and 27-dollar cents. This
signiﬁed a present value haircut of about 73% to 80%, which was considered
unacceptable by the market’s participants. The discount rate used in these
calculations was crucial. Most of the analysts considered reasonable to use
the yield of assets of similar-risk emerging market countries, which at that
moment was around 12-14%. 30
By late 2004 the international capital markets evolution unexpectedly
started to play in favor of the Argentinean oﬀer. The world liquidity
stimulated the appetite for risk, which turned out into an increasing
demand form emerging markets debt and into a reduction of the developing
countries’ risk premium. 31 In this new context, the swap looked more
attractive. The present value of the oﬀered bonds calculated with the
discount rate settled by the new ﬁnancial conditions (for instance 10%,
the Brazilian debt yield) was between 30 and 35-dollar cents. This present
value represented a 65-70% haircut and was similar to the market price of
the defaulted bonds. 32
The improvement in the ﬁnancial environment did not stop the pressures
for a better oﬀer; but it did pave the way for the government to
ﬁnally launch the swap practically without introducing any change in the
proposal announced in June 2004. To put pressure on the bondholders,
the government mentioned that it would be satisﬁed with a 50% level of
acceptance and warned the bondholders that they would not be another
oﬀer. 33
30 Brazil’s debt was commonly used as a benchmark. Its yield then oscillated around 12%.
The debt of Ecuador, a country that had recently restructured its external liabilities, yielded
a rate close to 14%. High yields were consequence of the unfavorable funding conditions that
the developing countries faced at that time. The JP Morgan EMBI+ index, which measures the
emergent market risk weighted average, showed an average value of 502 basic points in May-June.
In the same period Brazil’s country risk-premium averaged 691 basic points.
31 The EMBI+ index decreased to an average of 375 basic points in the last quarter of the year,
whereas the Brazilian country risk-premium fell down to 417 basic points. The yield of Brazilian
debt was about 9-10% and the yield of Ecuador bonds was about 11-12%.
32 Some ﬁnancial analysts opined that lower discount rates should be used, since after the
restructuring, the Argentinean debt would turn out to be less risky than many of the countries’
debts used as a benchmark for the calculation.
33 Moreover, aiming at relieving itself from the creditors’ pressures, the government resigned to
the right of changing the guidelines of the proposal, by sending a bill to the Congress – quickly
approved – that prevented the administration from doing it. The Congress should approve any
further modiﬁcation.
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The swap started on January 14, 2005. As minister Lavagna said, ‘it has
come the moment for the markets to talk’. Six weeks later the restructuring
operation was closed. On May 3, 2005, the government announced that the
acceptance had reached 76.15% of the debt in default. This meant that 62.3
billion dollars of the old bonds would be exchanged for about 35.3 billion
dollars of new instruments plus the corresponding GDP growth-linked
coupons. The maximum amount of the issuing would be 15 billion dollars
in the case of the Par bonds, 8.33 billion dollars in the case of the cuasi-Par
bonds and about 11.9 billion dollars in the case of the Discount bonds.
The government expressed satisfaction for the swap outcome. The operation
signiﬁed the reduction in the public debt stock by about 67.3 billion
dollars 34 and attenuated the public ﬁnances’ exposure to the exchange
risk, since around 44% of the new bonds are denominated in local currency.
5 Argentina, the IMF and the International Financial System
5.1 Argentina and the IMF between the crisis and the swap
It is at ﬁrst sight striking that the crisis and the massive default took
place in a country that for a long time was considered an example of the
Washington Consensus success. Almost until the end of the nineties, the
IMF and most of the ﬁnancial market’s analysts considered the experience
as one of the successful cases of macroeconomic policy and structural
reforms in the ﬁnancial globalization context.
The default in Argentina took place one year after the IMF gave a
considerable support to sustain the convertibility program in crisis. In
August 2001, four months before the default, the IMF expanded in 8
billion dollars the current stand by program and made a disbursement.
At that moment the crisis was in its peak. The devaluation and default
were openly discussed (particularly in ﬁnancial and academic settings in
34 According to the ﬁgures announced by the minister Lavagna, not published yet, in the end
of 2004 the debt amounted 191.2 billion dollars. With the achieved haircut the new debt stock
would amounts 123.9 billion dollars. The public debt/GDP ratio would have passed from 113%
to 72%.
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the United States) and there was a widespread opinion that the debt and
the convertibility regime were not sustainable.
The assistance to Argentina was the last rescue package approved by the
IMF in the period of the democrat administration in the United States. All
of the circumstances converged to make it an exemplary case for the critics
of the IMF administration.
The program openly showed weak ﬂanks opened to criticism from
its very conception. It did not involve any substantial change in the
current macroeconomic policy. Particularly, the exchange rate regime
was preserved. Besides the undeniable complexity and the diﬃculties
that a regime change would have implicated, there was a complete lack
of willingness to modify it among the authorities. Furthermore, from
the IMF’s side, the preservation of the regime was consistent with the
systematic support that the organization had provided throughout the
nineties. The Argentinean currency board regime was usually mentioned
as an example of a feasible corner solution for the exchange rate policy in
an emerging market country (Fischer (2001)).
The program aimed at recovering the conﬁdence through commitments
of ﬁscal austerity measures. The accomplishment of these measures was
unlikely and its eﬀects were doubtful. In the middle of the crisis the
recession and the liquidity crunch made to a great extent endogenous
the ﬁscal account deterioration. It was implausible that the issuing of
ﬁscal signals would be suﬃcient to stop the critical trends. In brief, in
the moment when the program was approved and even more in August
2001 – when the program was extended – there were good reasons to
think that the multilateral resources would end up funding payments to
the private creditors and capital ﬂights, without being able to stop the
crisis and prevent the default, as it actually happened. Certainly, some of
the characteristics of the rescue packages that were in the center of its
criticisms were clearly observable in the support given to Argentina.
After the changes in the head of the organization that followed the
republican take over of the US administration, the relationship of the
IMF with Argentina was a signiﬁcant example in the criticisms to the
previous management. The issue was important enough to carry out a
special investigation by the Independent Evaluation Oﬃce (IEO (2004)).
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The relationship between the IMF and Argentina after the devaluation and
the default is marked by that previous story in a curious way. Actually,
the IMF’s support was absent precisely when it would have been more
necessary: in the period after the devaluation, when eﬀorts to stabilize the
economy were in the center of the economic policy.
Although the new management’s criticisms to the support given by the
IMF to the convertibility regime were justiﬁed, this did not provide
any reason for not supporting the post-devaluation stabilization eﬀorts.
On the contrary, the self-criticism of the IMF certainly implies the
acknowledgement of its part of the responsibility for the crisis. Therefore,
the organization should have been even more committed with the
stabilization attempts.
With new authorities in both the institution and the country, at least
a cooperative attitude of the organization would be expected. The
institution’s orientation was precisely the opposite. The mentioning of ‘the
mistakes that we made with Argentina in the past’ helped to justify an
extremely reticent attitude. The negotiations were centered in only one
substantial matter: the Argentinean payments to the IMF.
The role played by the IMF in the stabilization and the recovery of the
economy in crisis was actually very negative. We have already mentioned,
for example, its positions regarding the exchange rate policy. In February
2002, in a context of high political fragility, the staﬀ exerted pressures
for the modiﬁcation of the exchange rate policy adopted by the country
after the exit of the convertibility regime (it was a ﬁxed exchange rate
system with controls on the purchases of international currency). This
system was explicitly set up as a transitory one, intended to stabilize the
nominal exchange rate while the domestic prices absorbed the impact of
the devaluation. A ﬂexible exchange rate should later on be established.
The IMF demanded the immediate pure ﬂotation of the exchange rate,
threatening with not reestablishing negotiations with Argentina while the
exchange controls were in place. As described in the previous chapter, the
measure demanded by the IMF was instrumented. It was followed by an
abrupt rise in the price of the dollar, as it was clearly expectable, and a
fast acceleration of inﬂation. The country got nothing in exchange of that
‘prior action’.
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Soon after, the recently designated Minister Lavagna implemented a
new stabilization program that preserved the ﬂotation but instrumented
interventions in the exchange market, and reinforced some exchange
controls aiming at stabilizing the exchange rate. This policy also faced
the opposition of the IMF, though in this opportunity the demands of the
institution were not satisﬁed. The interventions and the control measures
that were instrumented in spite of the opposition of the Fund’s staﬀ turned
out to be crucial for the exchange rate and the inﬂation stabilization.
Another example of the negative role of the IMF is the orientation that it
tried to impose to the bank crisis management. Since the Minister Lavagna
took over his function, the government looked for a gradual exit from
the crisis, favoring the generation of voluntary options for the savers and
avoiding new shocks to the system. Confronting this orientation, the staﬀ
promoted heroic ‘solutions’ with uncertain outcomes (banks liquidations,
the restructuring of the public banks, etc.). This issue derived into an open
conﬂict between the government and the Fund’s staﬀ that resulted in the
creation of an arbitrating commission mainly compounded by European
central bank’s former presidents.
The government did not satisfy the main demands of the IMF regarding the
management of the bank crisis. It persisted in its orientation, which ended
up showing success when the exchange market stabilized and an incipient
recovery of the economic activity helped to stabilize the savers’ behavior.
The crisis could be managed without ulterior disruptions in a context of
gradual growth in bank deposits.
The two mentioned examples indicate that the Fund’s staﬀ operated in
that phase with the diagnosis that the exchange market could not be
stabilized, that a hyperinﬂationary process was unavoidable and that it
would be impossible to reestablish some degree of ﬁnancial intermediation
in domestic currency in the near future (in fact, the staﬀ publicly
acknowledged the diagnosis mistake later on). It is clear that had the
economic policy followed the orientation that the IMF wanted, the evolution
of the economy would have been more similar to what the IMF expected.
The implementation of the measures promoted by the IMF would have
transformed its implicit diagnosis in a self-fulﬁlling prophecy.
The IMF sustained a negative attitude for a long time. In the second
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semester of 2002 the exchange market and the prices stabilized, and the data
of the activity level and the external sector performance started to show
positive outcomes. The staﬀ did not waste any occasion to make public its
disbelief regarding the sustainability of the stabilization and the recovery
of the activity and employment levels. In that matter, it is memorable the
public comment by the Deputy Manager Director Krueger, indicating that
the recovery showed by the data was ‘the bounce of a dead cat’. It was only
in May 2003 that the Deputy Manager Director publicly confessed to have
failed in her diagnosis and manifested having been surprised by the quick
economic recovery and by the fact that there was no hyperinﬂation.
The 2002 and 2003 agreements were signed in that high conﬂictive
context in the relationship between the Argentinean government and
the staﬀ. Given the attitude of the latter, the political inﬂuences were
crucial, specially the favorable position of the United States. In September
2003 a three-year agreement was subscribed intended to reﬁnance the
amortizations of the debt with the institution. The refunding mechanism
consists in crediting new funds for the equivalent amount of the capital
amortizations. This ‘fresh funding’ is subjected to the usual terms of
conditionality.
The terms of conditionality were established for the ﬁrst year. The terms
corresponding to the following two years were left to be deﬁned in future
negotiations. The most important of the committed targets was the
magnitude of the consolidated ﬁscal primary surplus. 3% of GDP was
determined only for the ﬁrst year of the agreement because the government
resisted the pressure to commit increasing targets for the following years.
Other important targets included in the agreement are the redeﬁnition
of the concessionaire contracts of public services and the establishment
of new regulations on the public utilities privatized in the nineties, the
establishment of new measures tending to reinforce the ﬁnancial system
and the approval of a law about ﬁscal revenues distribution between the
Nation and the provincial governments. The conditionality also included
a clause under which the country commits good faith in the treatment of
the external creditors. The ambiguity of the term left to the IMF a great
margin of discretion in the evaluation of the accomplishment of this clause.
One year later Argentina had comfortably fulﬁlled the quantitative ﬁscal
and monetary targets, but not the qualitative conditions. Probably, the
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most signiﬁcant one of those not fulﬁlled targets is the ﬁnalization of the
renegotiation of the contracts and the establishment of a new regulatory
frame for the privatized public utilities.
In the moment that the IMF had to evaluate the fulﬁllment of the
conditionality clauses the country was presenting the debt restructuring
proposal and organizing the swap. The relationship between Argentina and
the Fund reached then an impasse, which foundations we comment next.
The IMF could have terminated the agreement justifying the decision by
the no fulﬁllment of the qualitative targets or by resolving that Argentina
did not negotiate in good faith with the creditors. That would have signiﬁed
a serious negative shock for the country that was in the middle of the debt
restructuring process. Nevertheless, in those circumstances, the IMF would
have also placed itself in a diﬃcult position. Argentina is one of the big
debtors of the institution and there was a chance that the country stopped
giving seniority to the multilateral debt and suspended payments. This
would have generated a complex international problem. Furthermore, the
interpretation that the IMF was interfering in the country’s negotiation
with the bondholders could have not been avoided, in contradiction with
the doctrine saying that these matters should be solved by the parties
involved without the IMF’s intervention – particularly emphasized by the
United States.
The impasse was overcome through the suspension of the program.
Following a request from Argentina, the program was suspended until
the beginning of 2005. Since the suspension Argentina has paid to the
Fund all the interests and the amortizations that could not technically be
postponed and has asked and obtained the postponement of the payments
that did have this possibility. Moreover, some minor capital payments
were done which postponement could have been required. The Argentinean
government did so to avoid the board’s discussion of the Argentinean case
before the swap was ﬁnished. In the period 2002-2004 the country made
net capital payments to the IMF for more than 2.1 billion dollars, together
with another 1.9 billion dollars in interests.











































Table 6. Change in foreign debt and foreign assets by sector and period (in million of dollars)
Changes in
External debt of External assets of Net external
Public Financial Private Total Financial Private debt of private
Period sector (1) sector sector (2) sector sector (3) sector (2)-(3)
1991:4 to 1994:4 8,529 5,726 10,321 24,575 1,728 566 9,755
1994:4 to 1995:4 5,924 2,952 4,361 13,238 821 11,174 −6,813
1995:4 to 1998:2 9,222 11,579 15,607 36,407 15,307 15,050 557
1998:2 to 2000:4 8,523 −555 3,139 11,107 −4,274 11,876 −8,737
2000:4 to 2001:4 2,975 −8,053 −688 −5,766 −10,665 12,865 −13,553
Total 35,173 11,649 32,740 79,561 2,917 51,531 −18,791
(1) Including the Central Bank.




























































0The Argentinean Debt: History, Default and Restructuring
Table 7
Fiscal adjustment: Results of the Consolidated Public Sector (CPS)
(as a percentage of GDP)
Concept 2001 2004 Variation
(2004-2001)
Tax receipts 13.8 18.7 4.9
National Tax on exports 0.0 2.3 2.3
Public Financial tax (∗) 1.1 1.5 0.4
Sector VAT 3.1 3.4 0.4
Income tax 2.5 3.4 0.9
Other taxes (∗∗) 7.2 8.1 0.9
Other receipts 4.9 4.8 −0.1
Total receipts 18.8 23.5 4.7
Total expenditures 22.0 20.9 −1.1
Primary expenditures 18.2 19.6 1.4
Interest services 3.8 1.3 −2.5
Primary result 0.5 3.9 3.3
Total result of the NPS −3.2 2.6 5.9
Provinces(∗∗∗) −2.4 0.9 3.3
Total result of the CPS −5.6 3.5 9.2
(∗) Tax on bank debits and credits.
(∗∗) Includes taxes shared with provinces, which are included as
expenditures in the Primary expenditures item as transfers to provinces.
(∗∗∗) Including the City of Buenos Aires.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Economy.
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5.2 The United States position
The debt restructuring took place in the context of a conﬂictive relationship
between the IMF and the country, which is also a changing situation in
the role played by the IMF in the international ﬁnancial system. The most
unusual feature is that the design and management of the debt restructuring
were developed without the intervention of the IMF. This has no precedent
in the international ﬁnancial system constituted since the seventies. The
importance of this novelty is highlighted both by the record dimension of
the restructured debt and the unprecedented haircut, the highest in the
history of debt restructuring in the recent globalization period.
The position adopted by the United States government has been a crucial
element in the process. Throughout its public manifestations and mainly
throughout its inﬂuence in the IMF, it opened space to the development
of the Argentinean strategy. This political attitude has its foundation in
the orientation of the American government with respect the international
ﬁnancial system.
The American administration expresses the vision that the crises and
defaults result from excessive debts attributed to the irresponsible behavior
of both the countries and the lenders. This irresponsible behavior was
encouraged in the past by the implicit guaranty given by the IMF’s
rescue packages. We have already mentioned that the relationship between
Argentina and the IMF before the default was a prominent example of
those criticisms.
The United States demands less intervention of the IMF in the relations
between the countries and their private lenders, both under normal
conditions and in a default situation. The rejection by the United States
of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism initiative constituted a
well-deﬁned expression of that orientation.
The Argentinean government coordinated its discourse with this vision.
It also mentioned the co responsibility of the lenders and requested the
no intervention of the IMF, basing this demand in the fact that the
restructuring proposal did not involve additional multilateral funding. The
long term ﬁnancial program on which the proposal is based does not assume
EconomiA, Selecta, Bras´ ılia(DF), v.6, n.3, p.29–90, Jan/Jul 2005 82The Argentinean Debt: History, Default and Restructuring
additional multilateral funding in the future. The magnitude of the haircut
in part derives from this characteristic, as we explain below.
The high haircut does not put the United States government in an
uncomfortable position if it is presented as a particular feature of an
exceptional case. The haircut can be presented as proportional to the
irresponsibility shown by the market. In this special case the penalty
would not be excessive. It seems to be consistent that the penalty should
be exemplary tough in a case that has been placed as an example of
irresponsible behavior by the country, its lenders and the IMF.
For the mentioned reasons, the Argentinean strategy did not conﬂict with
the rhetoric of the United States government. On the contrary, throughout
its diﬀerent stages from 2001 on, the country has been playing an exemplary
role for the United States orientation towards the international ﬁnancial
system, since it illustrates both the system ﬂaws and the viability of
alternative ways to solve its problems. The United States opened space
for the implementation of the Argentinean restructuring strategy because
the case could provide support to the idea that the countries and the
markets can get around on their own, without the coordination and funds
of the multilateral organizations. The high level of acceptance of the swap
reinforces that idea.
5.3 Argentina and the IMF after the successful swap
In the moment we are writing these lines Argentina restarts the negotiations
with the IMF with the asset of a high proportion of acceptance of the
swap. The ﬁgure is not only relevant because it legitimizes the operation.
New actors and elements emerged after the episode such as the new bonds’
quotations and the voices of the ﬁnancial markets. After the swap Argentina
brings to its side an important number of bondholders interested in a
cooperative attitude of the IMF contributing to improve the new bonds’
market valuation. If, as it has been happening, the new bonds’ prices and
the voices of the market indicate the success of the restructuring, it becomes
more diﬃcult for the IMF to reject an agreement and to force Argentina
to choose between the continuation of the capital payments until the debt
extinguishes or the default of debt with the institution. Both alternatives go
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against the interests of the new bondholders. In addition, an extremely rigid
position of the IMF would result politically uncomfortable for some G-7
governments, since it would be seen in contradiction with the acceptance of
the haircut by the private creditors, who are the parties directly involved.
With the high acceptance of the swap, the IMF faces a fait accompli.
The outcomes of the swap indicate that the market has taken as a fact
that the multilateral debt would be reﬁnanced. It seems to be reasonable
presumption: How could the Argentine multilateral partners reject the
demand of the country if a private large majority accepted a record haircut?
This is the logic of the market but the institutional logic of the IMF is
diﬀerent and has its own weight.
The IMF faces the Argentinean requirement from the point of view of
its institutional logic. To comment this point is worth highlighting an
important aspect of the restructuring strategy. The long term ﬁscal ﬁnancial
program on which the restructuring proposal was based assumes that the
Argentinean public sector will not get any funding in the international
markets in the future. This assumption, together with the ﬁscal and
output-growth projections, is one of the parameters from which derive
both the magnitude of the haircut and the need to extend the terms of
the multilateral debt payments.
In the moment the restructuring proposal was designed any assumption
involving the renewed access of the Argentinean public sector to the
international market did not seem realistic. But beyond the viability
considerations the assumption resulted from a strategic policy decision of
the government. The restructuring proposal has one of its foundations in
that strategic decision: the country will not issue new public debt in the
international market. Consistently with this assumption/strategic decision,
the ﬁnancial program supporting the restructuring proposal requires the
longer term reﬁnancing of the multilateral debt. This is one of the
restructuring program components that the IMF would have certainly
questioned had it had the possibility to do it (it would have also questioned
the haircut and the magnitude of the projected primary ﬁscal surplus).
This aspect of the restructuring program is particularly uncomfortable for
the IMF. While the multilateral debt is in fact involved in the sustainability
of the program, the IMF did not participate in the design of the proposal
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and the ﬁnancial program supporting it.
The mentioned circumstances clash with the institutional logic. In this logic,
the reﬁnancing of the country’s debt involves the approval of new loans.
Actually, the purpose of these loans would be to provide support to a
ﬁscal ﬁnancial program based on an autonomous strategic decision of the
Argentinean government in which the IMF did not have any participation.
Consequently, the acceptance of the Argentinean demands would mean that
the IMF was forced to accept an important innovation.
The conﬂicts involved in the treatment of the Argentinean case are
exacerbated by the special circumstances that the institution is going
through.
The role that the IMF has been playing in the Argentinean sovereign
debt restructuring is in the antipodes of the crucial role delineated in the
initiative proposed by Anne Krueger at the beginning of her mandate.
From the beginning of the eighties the IMF actively participated in the
restructurings of sovereign debts with the private sector. Regarding this
tradition, the SDRM initiative seems to have been an attempt to precise,
formalize and strengthen the mentioned function of the IMF. As we have
already pointed out, after Wall Street and the United States government
rejected the SDRM initiative, the role of the institution in cases of sovereign
debt default remained undeﬁned. The US government rejection not only
frustrated the IMF initiative but also ended up questioning the very
participation of the IMF and the commitment of multilateral funds in the
restructuring of debts with the private sector.
Nowadays, the functions of the IMF in the international ﬁnancial system
are probably more undeﬁned than ever before and the institution lacks
of precise orientation. No new function replaced the role of ‘ﬁnancial
globalization central bank’ to which its performance got close in the
nineties. On the other hand, as we have already mentioned, the burial of
the SDRM initiative was a hard negative shock to the aspiration of a new
role for the institution, and nothing came in replacement.
The agreement with the IMF would complete and consolidate the
Argentinean debt restructuring. From the point of view of its objectives
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as a multilateral ﬁnancial institution, there is no doubt that the IMF
should give positive answers to the country’s demands and contribute to
its normalization. However, from the point of view of the institution as
a bureaucratic organization with its own interests, the agreement with
Argentina implies the formal acknowledgement of a much less important
role than the one played in the past.
It frequently happened that the developed countries governments – with
the particular inﬂuence of the United States – redeﬁned the functions of
the IMF while trying to deal with immediate and speciﬁc problems. That
happened, for example, in 1982, when a new function for the IMF in the
negotiations of defaulted external debts was deﬁned, after the Mexican case.
Something similar happened in 1995, also after a Mexican crisis, when the
rescue packages policy for dealing with capital account crises was instituted.
Under the light of this tradition, the Argentinean case may be indicating a
lasting redeﬁnition of the functions of the IMF in the international ﬁnancial
system.
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Appendix
Table 8
Evolution of the Gross Public Debt (National Government),
(since December 31st 2001 to December 31st 2003, in Million Dollars)
Item Amount (1) (2)
I. Total debt stock (December 31st 2001) 144,45 466 53.8
II.“Forced and inertial” debt increases resulting from 28,184
the breakdown of the convertibility regime(1+2+3)
1. Debt emission as from December 2001 28,525
To alliviate ﬁnancial system distress 14,390
To compensate the banks for the asymmetric pesification 5,904
To cover banks’ currency mismatch 2,400
To domestic savers 6,086
To assist Provinces 12,108
Provincial Warranted Bonds (B¨ OGAR) 9,679
To rescue provincial quasi-moneys 2,429
To cancel obligations with public workers, suppliers and others 2,028
To give back a 13% wage cut to public workers 873
Consolidation bonds (Bocones given to suppliers, etc.) 1,155
2. Eﬀects of pesiﬁcation, inﬂation adjustment (CER) and others −14,284
Debt reduction through pesification −22,086
Debt increases because of inflation adjustments (CER) 7,325
Adjustment of global bond with dollar conversion clause 477
3. Interest arrears as to December 31st 2003 13,943
Unpaid interests 9,974
Capitalized interests 3,969
III.Amortization, eﬀects of exchange rates’ variations and others 6,183
Debt amortization −5,411
Debt reduction through capital net payments to IFI’s −3,340
Debt reduction through other amortizations −2,071
Net Central Bank Credit to the National Government 2,851
Eﬀects of exchange rates’ variations and others 8,743
Total debt increases between December 31st 2001 34,367
and December 31st 2003
IV. total debt stock (December 31st 2003) 178,820 533 146.0
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Ministry of Economy.


















































Table 9. Characteristics of the restructuring bonds
The New Bonds (in millions of U$S)
Discount Par Quasi-par Total
Issuing of Acceptance<70% 20,170 10,000 8,330 (AR$24,300) 38,500
New debt Acceptance>70% 18,470 15,000 8,330 (AR$24,300) 41,800
Haircut 66.3% None 30,1%
Currency For existing securities in U$S, For existing securities in U$S, Peso+CER
Euro and Yen: original Euro and Yen: original
currency,U$S and Peso+ currency,U$S and Peso+
CER. For existing peso CER. For existing peso
denominated debt: denominated debt:
Peso+CER. For securities in Peso+CER. For securities in
other currencies:U$S,Euro other currencies:U$S,Euro
and Peso+CER nd Peso+CER
Governing law New York(Peso and U$S),UK New York(Peso and U$S),UK Argentina
(Euro),Japan(Yen)and (Euro),Japan(Yen)and
Argentina(Peso and U$S) Argentina(Peso and U$S)
Maturity 30 years 35 years 42 years
Grace period for the principal 20 years 25 years 32 years
Duration 25.25 years 30.25 years 37.25 years
Amortization Equal semi-anual payments Equal semi-anual payments Equal semi-anual payments
June and 31,December) March and 30,September June and 31,December)
Interest rate in U$S(accrual) 8.28%(fixed) 3.46%(average) 5.96%(fixed)(3,31% in AR$)
Interest payments Years 1 to 5: 3.97% Years 1 to 5: 1.33%
Years 6 to 10: 5.77% Years 6 to 15: 2.50% Years 1 to 10: 0%
Years 11 to 30: 8.28% Years 16 to 25: 3.75% Years 11 to 42: 5.96%
Years 26 to 35: 5.25% (3.31%in AR$)
Interest capitalization Years 1 to 5: 4.31% Years 1 to 10: 5.96%
Years 6 to 10: 2.51% (3.31%in AR$)
Years 11 to 30: -.- Nocapitalization Years 11 to 42: -.-
Date of interest payment Twice a year(30,June and Twice a year(31,March and Twice a year(30,June and 31,
31,December) 30,September) December)
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Table 10
Characteristics of New GDP-linked Units
Reference amount GDP-linked units will be issued in respect of the principal
amount of bonds tendered for exchange
Calculation currency Peso
Payment currency U$S, Euro, Yen, Peso
Maturity 30 years
Calculation date Annually on November 1, commencing in 2006
Payment date Annually on December 15, commencing in 2006
Payment amount 5% of excess GDP divided by the average free market
exchange rate of pesos per U.S. dollar, euro or yen,
during the 15 days preceding the payment date
Payment trigger Actual GDP(expressed in contant pesos)as of the
reference date exceeds the base case GDP, and the
annual growth rate exceeds 3%
Maximum payment The GDP-linked securities no longer be entitled to any
payments if the total amount paid,during its life,per unit
of GDP-linked security exceeds 0.48.This amount will be
referred as the “payment cap for GDP-linked securities”
Base case GDP Projected real GDP from December 31,2004,at an
approximate annual growth rate of 3%
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Ministry of Economy.
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